High and low working memory (WM) capacity individuals performed the serial reaction time task under both incidental and intentional learning condition s to determine the role of WM capacity in the learning of sequential information. WM capacity diff erences emerged in conditions of intentional but not incidental learning, indicating that individual diff erences in WM capacity occur in tasks requiring some form of control, with little diff erence appearing on tasks that reqnired relatively automatic pro cessing. Furthermore, an index of learning was significantly related to a measure of general fluid in telligence under intentional conditions only. Thus, the degree of learning was significantly related to higher order cognition, but only when intentional processing was emphasized.
High and low working memory (WM) capacity individuals performed the serial reaction time task under both incidental and intentional learning condition s to determine the role of WM capacity in the learning of sequential information. WM capacity diff erences emerged in conditions of intentional but not incidental learning, indicating that individual diff erences in WM capacity occur in tasks requiring some form of control, with little diff erence appearing on tasks that reqnired relatively automatic pro cessing. Furthermore, an index of learning was significantly related to a measure of general fluid in telligence under intentional conditions only. Thus, the degree of learning was significantly related to higher order cognition, but only when intentional processing was emphasized.
Much of the learning that occurs day to day can be conceived of as incidental. We may not intentionally at tempt to learn information, but regularities in the envi ronment may be learned via an unconscious associative mechanism. This type of! earning is generally referred to as implicit learning, which is typically considered to be complex learning that occurs via incidental processing in which a person is unaware of such learning (Buchner & Wippich, 1998; Seger, 1994) . Even though many envi ronmental regularities can be learned incidentally, there are certainly times when intentional learning is desired or even required for accurate performance. Although one may be able to incidentally Jearn grammar rules, for in stance, it may be desirable to actively engage in intentional learning to get a grasp of the intricacies of the language. Intentional learning is generally assumed to require some form of cognitive control (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schnei der & Shiffrin, 1977) , whereas incidental learning can be seen as occurring in a rather automatic fashion.
This article focuses on the extent to which individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity are re lated to the degree of learning of a sequential pattern. Current views of WM capacity suggest that it is impor tant in situations that require control but not in those in volving automatic processing (Conway & Engle, 1994; Rosen & Engle, 1997) . For example, studies have shown that WM capacity is important for learning in a variety of
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Individual Differences in WM Capacity
Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway (1999; see also view WM as a highly activated subset of long-term memory (LTM) units (see also Cowan, 1988 Cowan, , 1995 , processes for achieving and maintaining activa tion (e.g., phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, etc.) and executive attention. The activation of these units is dependent on the executive attention component (e.g., similar to the central executive in Baddeley's [1986] model), which serves to maintain current task goals, to process incoming information, and to block external (i.e., environmental distractors) and internal (i.e., other unrelated LTM units) interference. When we talk about WM capacity, we refer to one aspect of WM: the executive attention component .
Furthermore, we have suggested that the executive at tention component of the (Kane & Engle, 2003) , negative priming (Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 1999) , and enu meration (Tuholski, Engle, & Baylis, 200 I) . By this logic, we should see that high and low spans do not differ on relatively automatic forms of information processing, but that differences will emerge when control of attention is necessary (Conway & Engle, 1994; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Tu holski et al., 200l ) .
Incidental Learning of Sequential Information
Evidence suggests that implicit learning occurs rela tively automatically. The basic idea is that a person learns a complex set of rules or relations and that this occurs even when he or she is unaware of the learning and when learning occurs without intent. The assumption is that learning is accomplished with minimal attention (Frensch, Wenke, & Riinger, 1999; Stadler, 1995) . Thus, although one cannot say that implicit learning occurs in the com plete absence of attention, a person need only use mini mal attention to perform the given task and maintain the task goals in memory. The idea that attention is neces sary for implicit learning is quite controversial in the current literature (Shanks, 2003) .
Beginning with the work of Nissen and Bullemer ( 1987) , researchers have argued that attention is needed for implicit learning tasks. Most of this research has re lied on the use of the serial reaction time paradigm (SRT;
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and divided-attention para digms, in which a person performs both an implicit learn ing task and a concurrent attention-demanding task. The SRT is a simple task in which participants are presented with a stimulus (usually an asterisk) at one of four pre scribed locations on a computer screen. They are required to press a key corresponding to the location. The stimuli appear either in a predetermined sequence or at random.
Reaction times (RTs) in the repeating sequence condi tion get significantly faster over trials. The increase in RT when one switches from the repeating sequence to a random sequence is generally interpreted as an index of the amount of learning that has occurred.
A common technique for testing the effects of divided attention on the SRT is to have participants perform a tone-counting task while also performing the SRT task. These experiments generally show that performance on an implicit learning task diminishes if a concurrent task is used, suggesting that attention is needed for implicit learning to occur (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) . However, other researchers have pro posed that the consequences of a secondary task do not necessarily demonstrate that attention is needed for learn ing in the SRT, but rather that the secondary task somehow compromises sequence learning by disrupting a specific learning mechanism (Curran & Keele, 1993) , by reduc ing the capacity of short-term memory (STM; Frensch & Miner, 1994 ) , or by disrupting the encoding of the se quence (Stadler, 1995) . tioned to alway s be followed by another event, tend to be learned even under dual-task conditions. Ambiguous se quences, however, in which there are no unique associa tions, tend not to be learned under dual-task conditions.
That is, sequences in which an event is followed by one of two different events in different positions in the sequence are learned poorly under dual-task conditions. For exam ple, in the sequence 4213142, 4 is always followed by 2 (unique association), but l can either be followed by 3 or 4 (ambiguous association). Curran and Keele (1993) sug gested that the learning of unique sequences occurs with out attention but that learning of ambiguous sequences requires an attentional mechanism.
The Present Study
The present study attempted to determine the role of WM capacity in both incidental and intentional learning conditions. Here, we draw heavily on Cowan's (l 988, 1995) model, as well as on subsequent work performed by Frensch and Miner ( 1994) examining this model using the SRT paradigm. Cowan's (1988 Cowan's ( , 1995 ingly, they argued that implicit learning occurs due to a passive associative learning mechanism that detects en vironmental covariations. For the appropriate associa-tions to be made, items must be simultaneously activated in STM. Thus, any experimental manipulation that pre vents these associations from being active at the same time should result in reduced learning. In support of this claim, Frensch and Miner demonstrated that incidental learning of the sequence occurred more readily when the response-stimulus interval (RSI) was 500 msec, as op posed to 1,500 msec (Experiments I and 2). They argued that this manipulation affected activation levels by de creasing the time in which associations could be made in the activated portion of LTM and thus led to reduced im plicit learning. Furthermore, Frensch and Miner found that STM span measures were reliably correlated with an . indirect measure of learning under intentional and dual task learning conditions with an RSI of 500 msec. On the basis of this finding, they suggested that STM capacity only influences implicit learning when the capacity of STM is reached. Thus, implicit learning can be viewed as a passive association of the subset of activated LTM units, whereas explicit learning occurs due to an active associative mechanism directed by the central executive and in the highly activated subset of LTM units that are within the focus of attention.
With this framework in mind, we explored the role of WM capacity under both incidental and intentional learn ing conditions. The question guiding this study was whether high-and low-span differences are due to dif ferential learning ability per se, or whether differences only occur when attentional control is brought to bear on learning. lfWM span measures index the efficacy of the entire WM system (i.e., activation levels, STM capacity, representational coding, etc.), we should see that high and low spans differ in the degree to which they learn the repeating sequential pattern. If, however, WM capacity indexes the efficacy of only one component of the WM system (i.e., the central executive/executive attention), we should see that high and low spans show equivalent patterns of implicit learning. Learning should occur for both span groups, but no differences should emerge. Based on the framework of Cowan (1988 Cowan ( , 1995 and Frensch and Miner (1994) , central executive resources should be needed under intentional learning instructions to guide the focus of attention and engage in hypothesis testing. Thus, making the task instructions intentional should result in span differences in the degree of learn ing, in which high spans demonstrate more learning than do low spans.
To assess these predictions, we tested high and low spans on a typical version of the SRT task. Learning of the sequential pattern was assessed by examining the de crease in RT across the five blocks in whrch the pattern repeated itself. Another measure of learning was an ex amination of the difference between sequential and ran dom blocks of trials. Previous research (e.g., Stadler, 1995) has demonstrated that, as participants switch from blocks of repeating trials to blocks of random trials, a large increase in RT is observed. Finally, we assessed the level of awareness via two paper-and-pencil measures. If WM CAPAC ITY AND LEARNING 215 one span group were to demonstrate more learning under incidental conditions, it is important to show that this difference is not due to that group being more aware of the pattern than the other group. Therefore, participants were classified as being either unaware or aware, and high and low spans were compared to assess any poten tial differences.
METHOD
Participant Scree ning for WM Capacity The participants were prescreened for WM capacity using the operation span task (Ospan; Tu rner & Engle, 1989) . The Ospan has demonstrated good reliability and validity Klein & Fiss, 1999) . The task requires the participants to solve a series of math operations while trying to remember a set of unrelated words.
For example, the participants may see: "Is (9/3)
The participant is required to read the operation aloud without pausing and then to verify aloud whether the operation is correct ("yes" or "no"). After verification, the participant is required to read the word aloud, again without pausing. Once the participant reads the word aloud, the experimenter presses a key to move on to the next operation-word string. The same procedure is repeated until three question marks (???) appear, indicating to the partici pant that it is time to recall the words from that set in the correct order. The operation-word strings vary from two to five items in length. The Ospan score is the sum of recalled words for all per fectly recalled sets. In the present study, three sets of each length (two to five operation-word pairs) were presented to each participant, with possible scores ranging from 0 to 42. In addition, to ensure that participants were not trading off between solving the operations and remembering the words, an 85% accuracy criterion on the math oper ations was required.
Participants and Design
The participants were 50 high and 50 low spans, as determined by the Ospan. Those participants were classified on the basis of a distribution of over 2,000 Ospan scores from our laboratory, with high spans falling in the upper quartile of the distribution and low spans falling in the lower quartile. The participants were recruited from a subject pool at Georgia Institute of Te chnology and from the Atlanta community through newspaper advertisements. They were between the ages of 18 and 3 5 and received either course credit or monetary compensation for their participation. Each participant was tested individually in a laboratory session lasting approxi mately 45 min. The design was a 2 (span: high vs. low) X 2 (in struction: incidental vs. intentional} X 2 (sequence: random vs. re peating) X 12 (block) mixed factorial design, with sequence and block as the only within-subjects variables. There were 25 high spans and 25 low spans in each instruction condition.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimulus consisted of an asterisk centered at one of four un derlined horizontal locations. The asterisk and the underlined loca tions were presented in white on a black background. In the repeat ing condition, the sequence followed the predetermined hybrid sequence (see Cohen et aL, 1990 ) of 4231342, with the numbers 1-4 representing the four different screen locations. The pattern re peated itself l 0 times in one block of trials, with seven blocks over all, making a total of 490 sequence trials. In the random sequence condition, the asterisk followed a random sequence, with the excep tion that the asterisk could not appear at the same location twice in a row. There were five blocks of random trials, with a total of 350 trials, making a total of 840 experimental trials. The RSI was 300 msec. Responses were made by pressing one of four keys (F, G, H, J) cor responding to the location of the asterisk on the screen. All stimuli were presented and all data collected using a program written in E-Prime Version 1.0 on a PC.
Procedure
Serial reaction task. The participants were instructed to use the index and middle fingers on each hand so that the left fingers were positioned on "F" and "G" and the right fingers were positioned on "H" and "J," respectively. The participants also were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The participants first encountered a block of practice trials in which the asterisk followed a random sequence for 63 trials. The practice trials were used to allow the participants to become familiar with the task as well as to lead them to think that all trials would be random. Following the practice trials, the participants performed one block of random tri als followed by five blocks of repeating trials, switched to four more blocks of random trials and, finally, switched back to two blocks of repeating trials. The first block of random trials, similar to the prac tice trials, was used to discourage the participants from looking for a pattern within the sequence. To ensure that their results would not be confounded by fatigue, we gave the participants a 30-sec break between blocks 4 and 5 and between blocks 8 and 9.
Awareness assessment. After the participants finished the SRT task, they were told that sometimes the location of the asterisk fol lowed a repeating pattern and sometimes it did not. The participants then filled out a questionnaire to assess their level of awareness. It consisted of three questions. The first asked whether they had no ticed that the asterisk followed a pattern, the second asked whether they could indicate when they noticed that the asterisk followed a pattern, and the last asked whether they could describe the pattern:
Next, the participants filled out a recognition form in which the cor rect pattern was displayed along with 23 incorrect patterns. The participants were instructed to indicate which pattern the asterisk had followed, and if they could not remember or if they did not know which pattern was the correct one, to simply guess.
RESULTS

Participants
The mean Ospan scores for the 50 high and 50 low spans were 24.10 (SD 5.56) and 6.62 (SD = 2.24), respectively. In addition, the mean ages for the high and low spans were 22.74 years and 25.66 years, respectively.
SRT Data
Rate of learning. Overall, the accuracy in the SRT task was quite high. The mean accuracy rates for both high spans (M .969, SD = .023) and low spans (M = .964, SD = .028) were nearly identical, as were the ac curacy rates fo r both intentional (M = .964, SD .025) and incidental (M = .969, SD .026) instructional condi tions. The mean of the median RT fo r correct responses in each block of trials is shown in Figure 1 , as a function of WM span and instruction. Note that high and low spans differed substantially in baseline RT fo r the task. Submit ting the first block of random trials to an independent samples t test demonstrated that high spans were significantly faster (M 392 msec, SD 68.95) than were low spans [M 485 msec, SD 118.47; t(78.77) 4.76,p < .01]. Note that the variability for low spans was much greater than that fo r high spans, and thus the t test is based on equal variances not assumed, which is indi cated by the decrease in the degrees of freedom. On the basis of the large difference between high spans and low spans in baseline RT, the RTs were log-transformed for the statistical analyses. This served to move the RTs into the proportional measurement space, reducing the like lihood of finding a spurious interaction. This type ofRT transformation is common in dealing with age differ ences in RT, but less so in dealing with WM span differ ences in baseline RT.
The data suggested that both high and low spans learned the pattern the asterisk fo llowed in the patterned blocks, as indicated by a general decrease in their RTs across the experimental blocks and a subsequent increase in RT in the random blocks. In addition, high spans were faster than low spans, but the rate of learning fo r both high and low spans was equivalent under incidental learning con ditions. That is, high spans were faster at the onset than were low spans, but the slopes fo r each group were equiv alent, suggesting that both span groups learned the in formation at a similar rate. Under intentional learning conditions, however, high spans demonstrated a fas ter rate of learning than did low spans.
These conclusions were supported by a 2 (span: high vs. low) X 2 (instruction: incidental vs. intentional) X 5 (block: 2-6) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with block as the within-subjects variable. The ANOVA yielded · main effects of block [F(4,384) 28.06, MSe = 0.006, p < .01, partial17 2 = .23] and span [F(l ,96) = 26.93, MSe 0.93,p < .01, partialf / 2 = .22]. The main effect of instruction fa iled to reach significance [F < I, MSe = 0.006, partial 17 2 = .004]. Both the block X instruction and the block X span interactions were reliable [bothps < .01, and both partial172s > .04]. However, all of these ef fects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving span, instruction, and block [F(4,384) 2.53, MSe = 0.006,p < .05, partialf / 2 = .03]. This interaction suggested that high and low spans did not differ in the rate of learning under incidental learning conditions [F < 1, MSe = 0.002, partial172 = .016]. Critically, under intentional learning conditions, high spans demonstrated a faster rate of learning than did low spans [F(4, 192) 4.46, MSe = 0.009,p < .01, partial172 = .09].1 Thus, as predicted, WM span differences only emerged under conditions that emphasized intentional processing.
Examining performance fo r high spans across the two instruction conditions suggested that high spans in the intentional learning condition had a faster rate of learn ing than did high spans in the incidental learning condi tion [F(4,192) = 4.5l,MSe = 0.009,p < .Ol, partialf/2 = .09]. For low spans, no such difference emerged (F < 1, MSe = 0.003, partialf/2 = .01 ). Thus, it would seem that high spans benefited from the intentional instructions, whereas emphasizing the intent to learn did little for low spans relative to incidental learning instructions. Finally, an analysis of the fo ur random blocks of trials following the sequence blocks revealed no significant interactions involving either span or instruction condition (all ps < .15 and all 17 2s < .02).
Degree of learning. To better quantify the degree of learning of the repeating sequence, the mean difference in RT between the three blocks of sequence trials pre ceding the switch to random trials and the three blocks of random trials following the switch (i.e., blocks 4-6 and blocks 7-9; see Stadler, 1995) was examined. These values represent the difference in RT that occurs when participants switch fr om repeating trials to random trials. Therefore, planned comparisons were performed exam ining the differences between high and low spans on the difference score as a fu nction of instructional group. As predicted, the analysis revealed that high (M = 73 msec, SD = 65.45) and low (M 55 msec, SD = 53.88) spans did not differ in the degree of learning of the repeating sequence [t(48) = 1.09,p > .28, partial f/ 2 .024] under incidental learning conditions. Both groups learned the repeating pattern to some extent and learned the pattern to roughly the same degree. However, the degree oflearn ing was higher for high spans (M 121 msec, SD = 1 03.05) than for low spans [M = 50 msec, SD I 05.04; t(48) = 2.44, p < .05,partial f/ 2 .11] under intentional learning conditions. Thus, although both groups demon strated some learning of the pattern, high spans demon strated far more learning than did low spans.
Comparing high spans' degree oflearning in the two instruction conditions suggested that they learned more under intentional than under incidental learning conditions (mean difference 48 msec). This effect approached significance [t(48) = 1.98, p < .06, partial f/ 2 = .08]. Examining low spans' degree of learning suggested no difference between the instructional conditions [M 5 msec; t(48) -.206,p > .83, partial1]2 = .001].
Awareness Assessment Data
To determine that high and low spans do not differ in implicit learning, it is important that the results be ana lyzed based on awareness, since any differences between high and low spans' scores may be due to differing levels of awareness. Therefore, the awareness measures admin istered after the SRT task were analyzed on the basis of span. For these measures, responses were scored based on participants' answers to the questions on the self report measure and the score on the recognition measure. For the self-report questionnaire, participants received 0 points for no description or for an incorrect description of the sequence, I point for correctly describing the se quence of length 3-5, and 2 points for correctly describing the sequence of length 6-7 (Howard & Howard, 2001; Seger, 1997 .87, respectively). The interaction failed to reach significance (F < 1, MSe = 0.002).
Next, participants were classified as being either un aware (0 points), or partially/fully aware (e.g., Howard & Howard, 200 I). On the basis of these classifications, 5 low spans and 10 high spans in the incidental condition were deemed to have some awareness of the relation dur ing learning (leaving 20 low spans and 15 high spans who were unaware of the sequence). The possibly aware participants were dropped from further analysis, and the data were reanalyzed with the remaining unaware par ticipants. The analyses yielded qualitatively similar re sults as before. High and low spans did not differ in ei ther the rate of learning (F < I, MSe 0.002, partial � .006) or the degree of learning (p > .67, partia!'rfl = .006). Removing the aware subjects brought high and low spans closer together in terms of the degree of learning (M 59, SD = 61.68, and M = 49, SD 59.17, re spectively). In addition, note that both of the partial1]2s were much lower than before.
For the intentional learning condition, 9l ow spans and 12 high spans were deemed to have some awareness of the relation during learning (leaving 16 low spans and 13 high spans who were unaware of the sequence). We dropped the unaware participants and reanalyzed the data. The analyses suggested that high spans were still faster in their rate of learning [F(4,76) 3.80, p < .01, partial 1]2
.17] and demonstrated more learning [t(l9) 2.58, p < .05, partial r p .26; M = 187, SD = 89.35, and M = 87, SD 84.04, respectively] than did low spans.
In addition, note that both of the partial T]2s were much larger than before. Interestingly, although the partici pants were told of a pattern in the data, slightly more than half of them could not explicitly demonstrate any knowledge of it. This suggests the possibility that these awareness measures were not sensitive enough to detect differences in awareness of the pattern. This problem has been noted previously within the implicit learning liter ature (e.g., Stadler & Roediger, 1998) .
DISCUSSION
The primary question addressed in this study was whether WM capacity is important to incidental or in tentional learning. The pattern of results observed sug gests that high and low spans do not differ in the SRT task under incidental learning instructions (or if they do, the differences are very small) but do differ under inten tional learning instructions. Our results are consistent with those of other studies that have demonstrated small to nonexistent individual differences (e.g., in aging) in implicit learning (Frensch & Miner, 1994; Salthouse, McGuthry, & Hambrick, 1999) , but have shown that im portant individual differences emerge in the SRT under intentional learning conditions (Frensch & Miner, 1994; Howard & Howard, 2001) . We take these results to sug gest that individual differences in WM span become ap parent when intentional control, and hence executive at tention, is required.
In addition to demonstrating that span differences only emerge under intentional learning conditions, we wondered how this instructional manipulation would be related to a measure of higher order cognition. As noted in the introduction, one of the important aspects of WM span tasks is that they consistently predict performance on tasks of higher order cognition. Likewise, previous research has suggested that measures of incidental learn ing have small to nonexistent correlations with measures of higher order cognition such as reasoning, but that moderate correlations exist for explicit learning mea sures. In a large-scale(i.e., N = 455) correlational study, Feldman, Kerr, and Streissguth (1995) found that inci dental learning measures in the SRT had small to nonex istent correlations with a large battery of tasks including reasoning, processing speed, and STM. Declarative learn ing indexed via a generate task, however, demonstrated reliable correlations with virtually all of the measures, including intelligence (WAIS-R).
With this in mind, we wondered whether learning, as indexed by the degree of learning, would be related to higher level cognition as a function of task instruction.
Because the majority of our participants (n 96) had previously completed a measure of general fluid intelli gence (Raven Progressive Matrices) in our laboratory, we correlated the degree of learning with the total correct score for participants in each instructional group sepa rately.2 The analyses revealed a significant correlation between the degree of learning and general fluid intelli gence [r(47) = .48,p < .01] for the intentional learning participants, but a nonsignificant correlation for the in cidental learning participants [r(49) .17,p > .24]. Al though based on somewhat small sample sizes, these correlations indicate that the amount of learning ob served for the intentional learning group was related to a measure of higher order cognition but that the amount of learning in the incidental learning group was not. Note, however, that the differences in these correlations are due in part to differences in the amount of variabil ity for the two groups (SD incidental 60.06, SD inten tional = I 09 .16). However, if incidental learning is a function of automatic processing, we would expect little variability among subjects and for this variability to be relatively unrelated to higher order cognition.
We have argued elsewhere that WM capacity is the abil ity to use executive (controlled) attention to actively main tain representations within the focus of attention (Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle et al., 1999) . Furthermore, although the relation between attention and implicit learning re mains controversial, for the most part implicit learning seems to be an automatic process that operates without the use of the central executive. Thus, high spans are not always better at learning than low spans, but high spans demonstrate more learning when attention is engaged in learning. In addition, the results are inconsistent with models that suggest that individual differences in WM capacity are due to differences in overall activation lev els (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992) or to differences in the ability to set up temporary bindings of representations within the activated subset of memor y (e.g., Oberauer, in press). Rather, the results suggest that an additional mechanism (what we have labeled executive attention)
is responsible for individual differences in WM capacity.
In line with Cowan's (1988 Cowan's ( , 1995 model, we consider individual differences in WM capacity to correspond to differences in the efficacy of the central executive, which directs the focus of attention and "controls voluntary processing" (Cowan, 1988, p. 180) . In this view, differ ences should only appear when voluntary intentional processing is engaged in, and not incidental processing.
Indeed, Frensch and Miner (1994) have suggested that incidental learning occurs due to simple associations being made in STM that occurs without the use of the central executive in guiding the focus of attention. How ever, under intentional learning conditions, the focus of attention is engaged, via the central executive, to facili tate learning, perhaps through hypothesis testing. Under these conditions, not only is more learning demonstrated, compared with incidental learning, but WM span differ ences also begin to appear.
